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William C. Dudley
As I see it, a Federal Reserve consensus exists on how monetary policy
should respond to asset bubbles. It consists of three major observations:
1. Asset bubbles are hard to identify.
2. Monetary policy is not well-suited to respond to bubbles.
3. The cost/beneﬁt trade-oﬀ of “leaning against the wind” against asset
bubbles is unfavorable.
From these propositions, two important policy implications directly
follow:
1. The central bank should only take asset bubbles into consideration in
the conduct of monetary policy to the extent that these asset bubbles aﬀect
the growth/inﬂation outlook.
2. The monetary authorities should be there to “clean up” after bubbles
burst, both to prevent systemic problems and undesired downward pres-
sure on economic activity or inﬂation.
Relative to this consensus, I would argue that:
1. Asset bubbles are not that hard to identify—especially large ones.
2. If one means by monetary policy the instrument of short-term inter-
est rates, then I agree that monetary policy is not well-suited to deal with
asset bubbles. But this suggests that central bankers should examine the
eﬃcacy of other instruments in their toolbox, rather than simply ignore the
development of asset bubbles. Parenthetically, this may require develop-
ment of additional policy tools if the current tools are deemed inadequate.
3. When the possibility of additional instruments is added to the mix,
this may improve the cost/beneﬁt trade-oﬀ from addressing asset bubbles
early, prior to these bubbles bursting.
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William C. Dudley was an advisory director at Goldman Sachs when these comments were
presented. He is currently the executive vice president of the Markets Group at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
I thank John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein for inviting me to participate.So let’s examine in more detail where my views deviate from the Fed con-
sensus.
Turning ﬁrst to the issue of the diﬃculty of identifying asset bubbles, I
don’t think major asset bubbles are hard to identify. What is diﬃcult to de-
termine is how big a bubble will ultimately be and the causes and timing of
its demise.
Over the past twenty-ﬁve years, for example, I can identify at least ﬁve
bubbles that one could reasonably have identiﬁed in real time:
1. Dollar appreciation in 1984 to 1985
2. Stock market overvaluation in 1987
3. Credit market spread widening in 1998 associated with the failure of
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
4. Dotcom and NASDAQ bubble of 1999 to 2000
5. Regional U.S. housing bubbles that are currently in the process of un-
winding
I say this with some conﬁdence because I tried to speculate against three
of the ﬁve bubbles listed in the preceding myself (with limited success I
might add, indicating why I remain an economist rather than have transi-
tioned to being a trader). And I probably would have tried to speculate
against the other two had good market instruments been available to do so.
As I see it, the development of an asset bubble generally consists of three
major stages. First, there is some sort of regime shift that generates an ini-
tial rise in valuation that is justiﬁed and sustainable. For the U.S. equity
market of the later 1990s, this would include factors such as the reduced
cyclicality of the economy, benign inﬂation, or the secular rise in the pro-
ductivity growth trend. The ﬁrst two factors could have been expected to
lead to a lower equity risk premium and higher equity prices. The latter fac-
tor could be expected to lead to a higher earnings growth rate.
For the U.S. housing market of the past ﬁve years, the initial impulse to
the housing price rise was the fall in long-term interest rates. Only begin-
ning in 2004 did the housing market become a bubble. In some regions,
prices continued to rise much faster than income even though mortgage
rates were no longer declining.
Second, the rise in valuation leads to a change in perception about the
riskiness of investing in the asset class. Rather than the asset being per-
ceived as more risky as the price rises, it is perceived to be less risky because
it has not gone down in price. There is a corollary to this. Investors tend to
raise their expectations of the prospects for future price appreciation after
the asset has gone up in price, when, in fact, rapid price appreciation
should lead investors to lower their expectations. If expectations are adap-
tive rather than fully rational, this can contribute to asset bubbles.
Third, the price appreciation causes the believers in the sustainability of
the bubble to forget about the fact that the economy has important self-
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prices rise, all else equal. This reduces the cost of capital, which, in turn,
stimulates investment. The rise in investment puts downward pressure on
proﬁt margins and upward pressure on real interest rates. Both weigh on
valuation and undermine the fundamental supports for the initial rise in
stock prices.
Oftentimes, the trigger for the collapse of an asset bubble is some event
that calls into question a widely held market belief. For example, one trig-
ger for the LTCM debacle was the decision of Russia to default on its ruble
debt. This was unexpected because market participants thought the worse-
case scenario was that Russia would just print more rubles to service its
debt. Another example is the role of portfolio insurance in the 1987 stock
market crash. Portfolio insurance works to limit risk if market prices ad-
just continuously. In 1987, prices gapped lower, and portfolio insurance
played an important role in making prices move discontinuously. After the
fact, the ﬂaws of portfolio insurance were self-evident. But when it oc-
curred, it was unanticipated.
With respect to the assertion that monetary policy is ill-suited to re-
spond to asset bubbles, I generally agree with this view if, by monetary pol-
icy, we are referring to the level of short-term interest rates. I doubt that an
additional 50 to 100 basis points of monetary policy tightening in the 1999
to 2000 period would have had a signiﬁcant impact on the dot-com bubble.
That said, I reach a very diﬀerent conclusion than the Federal Reserve
consensus. Rather than just giving up and saying that monetary policy
doesn’t work well with respect to asset bubbles, I would argue that the more
appropriate conclusion is that this just underscores the need to develop
other instruments to use to address such bubbles.
In reaching this conclusion, I would emphasize that the need for new
tools has increased. As the role of depository institutions has diminished
in the ﬁnancial system relative to the capital markets, the tools of pruden-
tial supervision and regulation of depository institutions most likely has
become less eﬀective in preventing or limiting bubbles. This is especially
true in cases in which credit standards are determined by the capital mar-
kets rather than depository institutions.
Consider, for example, the case for mortgages and credit derivative obli-
gations. The prices for most of these types of obligations are not deter-
mined by banks but instead are determined in the capital markets. If bank
examiners try to limit the type of mortgage loans that banks make, but the
capital markets have a strong appetite for this type of risk, then tough bank
supervision would not prevent this business from occurring. Instead, it
would simply be forced out of the banking system into the capital markets.
So what tools are available? Unfortunately, not many and not very eﬀec-
tive ones at that.
Two major tools come to mind. First, the monetary authorities have the
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expectations. For example, with respect to the stock market boom, Federal
Reserve oﬃcials could have emphasized that higher productivity growth
would generate an investment boom that would put pressure on proﬁt mar-
gins or that higher productivity growth would lead to higher real interest
rates that would put pressure on stock market valuation.
If you look at the evidence from the period, it is quite striking. Corporate
proﬁt margins peaked in 1997. But the earnings expectations of equity an-
alysts kept increasing until the stock market bubble collapsed. For example,
in the early 1990s, the median long-term earnings growth estimate of equity
analysts was 12 percent per year. By 1997, it had climbed to slightly below
14 percent per year. It did not stop climbing until it reached a peak of 17
percent per year in 2000. Clearly, the behavior of proﬁt margins and equity
analyst expectations were inconsistent. Federal Reserve oﬃcials could have
emphasized this disconnect in their speeches and testimony.
In fact, Chairman Greenspan reached a very diﬀerent conclusion that
had a much diﬀerent implication. He cited the rise in equity analysts’ earn-
ing growth expectations as evidence that the increase in productivity
growth was sustainable. Perhaps, this was not the proper emphasis!
Second, margin requirements could be used to discourage speculative
activity. Federal Reserve oﬃcials rejected the use of equity margin require-
ments in response to the stock market bubble because they concluded that
such margin rules could be easily circumvented. Although the require-
ments could be circumvented, an increase in stock market requirements
might still have had an impact. The announcement eﬀect alone might have
had an impact. We just don’t know because Fed oﬃcials didn’t try to use
this instrument. If the Fed had tried and failed, I would be more willing to
conclude that margin rules will not work.
Moreover, Fed oﬃcials could have pushed for broader authority to make
it more diﬃcult for investors to circumvent the margin rules. The margin
requirements could have been broadened. Or the margin requirements
could have been altered in a way to better target their impact. For example,
if the margin requirement had been tied to volatility, this would have im-
plied higher margin requirements on NASDAQ-style equities, precisely
the result intended.
Supervision and regulation of depository institutions, the “bully pulpit,”
and margin requirements—together they do not make a very full or eﬀec-
tive tool kit. This suggests that Fed oﬃcials and others should explore de-
veloping additional instruments to add to the Fed’s arsenal.
In addition to broader margin rules, this might include capital adequacy
rules and or counterparty risk rules designed to limit leverage and risk. In-
creased disclosure requirements of portfolio positions by lightly regulated
institutions such as hedge funds might also prove useful. Consider the
LTCM debacle. Long-Term Capital Management was much more highly
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ated. Also, many major market participants had market positions similar
to LTCM’s. Better disclosure might have limited the ability of LTCM to ex-
pand its risk positions, and it could also have discouraged market partici-
pants from taking similar types of positions.
The disclosure of portfolio positions would enable investors to ﬁnd out
when the “hot money” is all positioned the same way. Such a revelation
would change investors’ perceptions of risk and could help dampen spec-
ulation and incipient asset bubbles.
I clearly don’t have the answer with respect to designing new tools for
central bankers to use to address asset bubbles. But I think a more fruitful
line of inquiry is to move in this direction. In my mind, the issue of whether
short-term interest rates should be adjusted to lean against asset bubbles is
mostly settled. It is time to move on and explore how central bankers can
develop better tools to respond to asset bubbles.
Discussion Summary Donald L. Kohn, Laurence H. Meyer, and
William C. Dudley
Martin Feldstein asked Donald L. Kohn for his views on Japanese real es-
tate values. When capitalization rates were at 2 percent at a time when
Japanese government bonds were yielding at least as much, should the
Bank of Japan have responded? Kohn replied that he had been in favor of
improving the supervision and regulation of Japanese banks. It had been
clear that there was a problem in the banking system. If the Japanese ﬁ-
nancial system had been reformed earlier, and the Bank of Japan had re-
sponded more quickly when the bubble burst, economic outcomes in Japan
would have been better. Kohn agreed with Feldstein’s suggestion that the
government should not have allowed banks to support their balance sheets
with equities whose valuations depended on high land values.
Feldstein said that Alan Greenspan’s approach had been that the central
bank should intervene swiftly following the bursting of a bubble. He sug-
gested that in Japan, however, no amount of monetary easing could have
rescued the banks. Kohn responded that a rapid response from the central
bank would have helped considerably and that such a response would have
ensured that less deﬂation occurred. Studies at the Fed suggested that al-
though recession could not have been averted, it could have been shorter
and less deep.
Feldstein asked William C. Dudleywhat he thought could be done to im-
prove the already impressive resilience of the U.S. ﬁnancial system. Dud-
ley said that although the mortgage market worked well in stable economic
420 Remarksconditions, policymakers should worry about how the subprime market
would fare if the economy weakened while house prices declined. Also, the
Fed should think about how to expand its span of control. He suggested
that further disclosure requirements were needed for creative mortgage
products such as negative amortizers and teaser adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs).
Feldstein said that he was intrigued by Laurence H. Meyer’s proposal
that the Fed should issue quarterly reports on asset prices. But, on the
other hand, Graham and Dodd’s book recommended that the price-
earnings ratio should be around 10. If Feldstein had believed that, he
would never have invested in the market. There was a risk that the Fed
would wrongly encourage people to sit out of the market. Meyer replied
that the Fed should present the conventional wisdom—which may evolve
over time. Furthermore, he said, the Fed has the advantage of being seen
to have sober judgment. There are, in any case, beneﬁts of airing diﬀerent
points of view. Dudley said that he agreed with this point. In 1999 to 2000,
for example, bearish equity analysts were out of a job. It was important to
have someone who was still in business at a time like that presenting a dis-
senting view.
John Y. Campbell pointed out that the Fed has a comparative advantage
in helping people to understand the distinction between real and nominal
quantities. Feldstein commented that Allan Meltzer’s book revealed that
even the Fed had only relatively recently understood the distinction.
Campbell also mentioned a paper by Federal Reserve Board economists
Brian Bucks and Karen Pence that demonstrates that the distribution of
self-reported ARM mortgage risks is very diﬀerent from the true distribu-
tion as reported by mortgage lenders. This implies that some mortgage
borrowers do not understand their true risk exposures.
Glenn D. Rudebusch said that the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) had been vocal about house-price bubbles and
appeared to have been successful in controlling them. Kohn replied that in
the case of Australia, there had also been a change in the tax law so that the
treasury and central bank had been working together. Dudley pointed out
that there had also been a terms-of-trade shock in Australia’s favor, which
had strongly underpinned the Australian economy.
Rudebusch asked whether the view of the Fed as a street sweeper clean-
ing up problems—the so-called Greenspan put—had driven up equity
prices as investors felt that they would be protected against price declines.
Dudley responded that given that the NASDAQ index went from over
5,000 to less than 1,500, the put had clearly been well out of the money!
Peter Westaway asked Meyer whether he would suggest publishing an
unconditional indicator such as a price-earnings ratio, or, on the other
hand, something like a risk premium. He also suggested that the Fed’s as-
set price report might be suﬃciently complicated that it would require a
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nical. The distinction between conditional and unconditional price indica-
tors was not too important because in equilibrium, increases in the price-
earnings ratio are associated with decreases in the risk premium. He said
that he liked the simplicity of a measure such as the price-earnings ratio.
Stephen G. Cecchettisaid he also agreed with Meyer’s proposal. He com-
pared such a report with the numbers produced by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) or Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Given that in-
dustrial production indexes are based on all sorts of imputed statistics, why
not do the same in this case? Kohn argued that if there were an academic
consensus, the question would be easier. But in 1996, 50 percent of aca-
demics thought the market was too high, and 50 percent thought it was too
low. Meyer said that that was true when the market price-earnings ratio
was 18, but as it rose to 25 or 30, a consensus developed among academics
that rationally expected returns on equity had declined.
Brian Sack said that he agreed with Kohn’s points about the cost of act-
ing against bubbles that turn out not to be bubbles. He suggested that this
was dependent on the particular asset class in question. For example, in the
case of equities, a bubble is associated with a low risk premium or high ex-
pected earnings growth. In either case, an interest rate increase is called for.
But in the case of bonds, a bubble is associated with low risk premiums or
low expected inﬂation. These two scenarios call for diﬀerent interest rate
responses. Kohn responded that he had in mind the cost of sacriﬁcing some
short-run output. He agreed that diﬀerent assets would have diﬀerent sac-
riﬁce ratios.
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